The bound added in CVE-2026-32316 (e47e56d22) still allowed
`sizeof(jvp_string) + (currlen + len) * 2 + 1` to wrap `size_t` on
32-bit platforms. Tighten the threshold so the final allocation
fits in 32-bit `size_t`.
Also break out of `jv_string_implode` and `f_string_implode` once
`jv_string_append_codepoint` returns an invalid `jv`; otherwise the
next iteration triggers the assertion in `jvp_string_ptr` (or
invokes undefined behavior under `-DNDEBUG`).
Fixes CVE-2026-54679.
Co-authored-by: Dirk Müller <dirk@dmllr.de>
When `jv_string_append_buf` overflows the string length limit,
it returns an invalid `jv`; `jv_load_file` then re-entered it
on the invalid value and overran the heap. Break out of the loop
once the value is invalid.
Fixes CVE-2026-49839.
The table was declared with 255 entries but indexed by an unsigned
char, so the decoder would read one byte past the array for input
bytes equal to 0xFF. Through jq's normal input paths the over-read
is unreachable because invalid UTF-8 bytes are normalized to U+FFFD
before reaching @base64d, but the table is still wrong at the C
level and reachable by libjq callers that construct strings via
the C API without UTF-8 validation.
jv_equal and jv_cmp overflows the C stack on deeply nested
input. Cap recursion at 10000 with -1 / INT_MIN sentinels;
operators that compose user expressions surface this as
"Equality check too deep" / "Comparison too deep".
Fixes CVE-2026-47770.
jq used to recurse without bound on mutual or self-referential
`import` declarations, exhausting the stack. Track each library's
load state with a `loading` flag set before its dependencies are
processed; a recursive reference to an in-progress library now
reports "circular import of X".
Fixes CVE-2026-44777.
jq accepts embedded NUL bytes at the language level but resolves
module import paths through NUL-terminated C strings, so the path
validated by policy or audit code could differ from the on-disk
path jq actually opens. Pass jv through gen_import so the AST
preserves the original bytes, and reject embedded NULs in
validate_relpath.
Fixes CVE-2026-43895.
A signed-int overflow in decNumber's D2U macro lets huge literals
write attacker-controlled bytes past a stack buffer. Cap the length
before calling decNumberFromString, and pre-slice long strings in
jv_dump_string_trunc so the resulting error message doesn't itself
allocate a multi-GiB buffer.
Fixes CVE-2026-43894.
Deeply nested path arrays can cause unbounded recursion in
`jv_setpath`, `jv_getpath`, and `jv_delpaths`, leading to
stack overflow. Add a depth limit of 10000 to match the
existing `tojson` depth limit. This fixes CVE-2026-33947.
The hash function used a fixed seed, allowing attackers to craft colliding keys
and cause O(n^2) object parsing performance. Initialize the seed from a random
source at process startup to prevent the attack. This fixes CVE-2026-40164.
Co-authored-by: Asaf Meizner <asafmeizner@gmail.com>
In `jvp_string_append`, the allocation size `(currlen + len) * 2` could
overflow `uint32_t` when `currlen + len` exceeds `INT_MAX`, causing a small
allocation followed by a large `memcpy`.
In `jvp_string_copy_replace_bad`, the output buffer size calculation
`length * 3 + 1` could overflow `uint32_t`, again resulting in a small
allocation followed by a large write.
Add overflow checks to both functions to return an error for strings
that would exceed `INT_MAX` in length. Fixes CVE-2026-32316.
I love jq :) So while updating the version we ship in Solaris I have
tried to modify stuff to make everything work out of the box. Just
```
autoreconf -fiv
./configure
gmake
gmake check
```
I also went ahead and created Solaris test action should you be
interested in having it too. The changes are not extensive and I have
tried to comment them nicely in each commit. Hopefully that's enough.
Thanks for jq!
- Fix segfault when --skip/--take is the last argument.
- Fix FILE handle leak: opened test files were never closed.
- Support running multiple test files in one invocation.
Copy `kk` and `vk` before passing to jv_object_get(), which consumes
its arguments. Without copies, subsequent loop iterations read freed
memory (CWE-416) and post-loop jv_free() double-frees (CWE-415).
This bug was introduced in `b279713e` when array processing was hoisted
out of
the loop into locals without accounting for jv_object_get() semantics.
Fixes GHSA-gf4g-95wj-4q4r.
When a module fails to parse as a library, `load_library` cached the
invalid block. A second import/include of the same module would find
the cached invalid block and pass it to `block_bind_library`,
triggering the assertion failure. Skip caching the block when there
are parse errors to avoid this problem.
This commit improves performance by refactoring `@uri` and `@urid`
to pre-alloacte buffers and build the `jv` string at the end.
Also, this fixes `@urid` to prevent multi-byte UTF-8 corruption,
and to preserve embedded null bytes.
Was detect by AFL build but it's unsure if possible to trigger in non-fuzz build.
Oniguruma has a default limit of 4096 but this is not be low enough to
protect from stack-overflows in some builds like with AFL where it seems
to use more stack space. A limit of 1024 should be enough usage-wise
and also give more margin.
WinkleMad