Randomize hash seed to mitigate hash collision DoS attacks
The hash function used a fixed seed, allowing attackers to craft colliding keys and cause O(n^2) object parsing performance. Initialize the seed from a random source at process startup to prevent the attack. This fixes CVE-2026-40164. Co-authored-by: Asaf Meizner <asafmeizner@gmail.com>
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@@ -149,6 +149,8 @@ AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct tm.tm_gmtoff], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_TM_TM_GMT_OFF],1,[Define
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AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct tm.__tm_gmtoff], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_TM___TM_GMT_OFF],1,[Define to 1 if the system has the __tm_gmt_off field in struct tm])],
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[], [[#include <time.h>]])
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AC_FIND_FUNC([setlocale], [c], [#include <locale.h>], [0,0])
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AC_FIND_FUNC([arc4random], [c], [#include <stdlib.h>], [])
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AC_FIND_FUNC([getentropy], [c], [#include <unistd.h>], [0, 0])
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dnl Figure out if we have the pthread functions we actually need
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AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS([pthread_key_create], [], [#include <pthread.h>], [NULL, NULL])
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